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Abstract - Security metrics have become essential for 
assessing the security risks and making effective decisions 
concerning system security. Many security metrics rely on 
mathematical models, but are mainly based on empirical data, 
qualitative method, or compliance checking and this renders 
the outcome far from accurate. This paper proposes a novel 
approach to compute the probability distribution of cloud 
security threats based on Markov chain and Common 
Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The paper gives an 
application on cloud systems to demonstrate the use of the 
proposed approach. 
Keywords - Security threats, quantitative security metrics, 
Markov Chain. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
To ascertain the security of a cloud system, it is 
necessary to develop meaningful metrics to measure 
appropriately the system’s security level or status. Lord 
Kelvin considered that when you can quantify or measure 
what you are talking about, and show it by figures and 
numbers, you can know apart of it; however, in case you can 
not quantify it, you can not show it in numbers, your 
knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind [1]. This 
idea is the source of inspiration and motivation for scholars 
who generate security metrics that can express in numbers. 
There are many security metrics proposed to satisfy the need 
for measuring the security of cyber space from industrial 
organizations and researchers. The Center for Internet 
Security (CIS) published a number of security metrics in 
management, operation, and technique [2]. The National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) developed 
security metrics in implementation, effectiveness, and 
impact [3]. Other metrics have been proposed in Risk 
assessment and network security evaluation [4-6]. 
There are several security metrics related to the 
computation of probability of security threats. Mean Failure 
Cost is one of the sound approaches to quantitative security 
metrics when it takes various security components like 
stakeholders, security requirements, security threats into 
account [7]. The probability distribution of security threats is 
central to this metric, but, this computation is mainly based on 
empirical or qualitative data. Some security metrics, related to 
successful attacks, are specific to a particular kind of attacks 
and hence they cannot be generalized. Realistically, to assess 
security of a system, all aspects of security threats are 
essential, and a security model should take all security threat 
angles into account.  
To our best knowledge, we hardly found a model that 
computes the probability distribution of security threats. The 
paper proposes a security threat model based on Markov 
theory to calculate the probability distribution of security 
threats in cloud systems. For this purpose, the Common 
Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) will be applied to 
compute the probability of each attack paths. For evaluating 
the proposed method, cloud security threats reported by 
Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) will be investigated. 
Major contributions of this paper are as follows: 
• It proposes the security threat model that takes all 
known and major cloud security threats into account. 
• It applies Markov chain and CVSS to the proposed 
model to predict the probability distribution of 
security threats. 
• It demonstrates the use of the model and its 
computational method on a cloud security system.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 provides the background of metrics related to 
security threats and Markov chain in security metrics. Section 
3 analyses the relationship between security threats and 
vulnerabilities. Section 4 proposes the security threat model 
based on Markov chain. In section 5, the calculation of 
probability distribution of security threats will be expressed. It 
also discusses the application of the proposed metric. The 
conclusion with suggestion for future work will be concluded 
in section 6. 
II. RELATED WORK 
This section discusses related work concerning security 
metrics related to security threats. 
A. A security metric related to probability distribution of 
security threats.  
Ben et al. introduced a security metric called Mean Failure 
Cost (MFC) is a metric that measure the security of a IT 
system through quantifying variables including stakeholders, 
the loss resulting from security threats [7]. It includes several 
desirable features: it identifies stakeholders and provides the 
cost for each as a result of a security failure; it measure the 
cost financial loss in a unit investigated time ($/h). Despite 
these appropriate considerations, MFC has a major drawback 
in that the security threats probability distribution is based on 
simple empirical data, while security threats are changeable, 
dynamic, and specific to different IT systems. Due to the 
stochastic nature of threats, modelling their probability 
distributions has become a necessity for any security 
measuring and predicting system. Relevant and sound 
classification of threats in terms of deployed vulnerabilities, 
attack motivation perspectives, and likelihood of successful 
attacks are essential to facilitate the identification of potential 
security threats and the development of security 
countermeasures. 
B. Markov theory in security metrics 
For a Markov process, the conditional probability 
distribution of future states of the process (conditional on 
both past and present states) depends only on the present 
state, not on the sequence of events that preceded it.  Based 
on this property, several studies have deployed Markov for 
modelling security metrics. In [8], Ariel et al. used Discrete 
Markov Chain Model to predict next honeypot attacks. In 
[9], to detect anomaly attacks in an intrusion detection 
system (IDS), Patcha et al. used Hidden Markov Chain to 
model this system. In [10], Bharat et al. used Semi Markov 
Model (SMM) to quantify the security state for an intrusion 
tolerant system. In this work, Discrete Time Markov Chain 
(DTMC) steady-state probability was applied to compute 
the mean time to security failure (MTTSF). In [11], 
Anderson et al. proposed a malware detection algorithm 
based on the analysis of graphs that represent Markov 
chains from dynamically collected instruction traces of the 
target executable. In [12], Jaafar et al. used attack path 
concept and time is used to calculate transition probabilities. 
In terms of security metrics, most research used Markov 
Model in predicting security attacks or malware 
propagations. To our best knowledge, we have hardly found 
studies that take the consideration of applying Markov chain 
for computing the probability distribution of security threats. 
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CLOUD SECURITY 
THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES 
In this section, we explore the relationship between 
security threats and vulnerabilities to identify potential 
attacks.  
A security threat is considered as a potential attack leading 
to a misuse of information or resources, and vulnerability is 
defined as the flaws in a cyber space that can be exploited by 
hackers. As a result, a security threat is a potential attack that 
may or may not happen, however it has the potential to cause 
damages. First, we clarify the cloud security threats based on 
the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) report [13]. The report 
released twelve critical security threats specifically related to 
the shared, on-demand for cloud computing with the highest 
impact on enterprise business. 
• Data Breaches (DB).  These are security incidents in 
which confidential or protected information is 
released, stolen or unauthorizedly used by an attacker. 
• Weak Identity, Credential and Access Management 
(IAM). Attacks may occur because of inadequate 
identity access management systems, failure to use 
multifactor authentication, weak password use, and a 
lack of continuous automated rotation of cryptographic 
keys, passwords, and certificates. 
• Insecure interfaces APIs (Application Programming 
Interface). The security of fundamental APIs is vital 
key role in availability of cloud services. From 
authentication and access control to encryption and 
activity monitoring, these interfaces must be designed 
to protect against both accidental and malicious 
attempts to circumvent policy.  
• System Vulnerabilities (SV).  These are exploitable 
bugs in programs that attackers can use to infiltrate a 
computer system for stealing data, taking control of the 
system or disrupting service operations. Vulnerabilities 
within the components of the operating system - 
kernel, system libraries and application tools - put the 
security of all services and data at significant risk. 
• Account Hijacking (AH).  It is a traditional threat with 
attack methods such as phishing, fraud, and 
exploitation of software vulnerabilities. 
• Malicious Insiders (MI). It is defined as a malicious 
insider threat created by people in organizations, who 
has privileged access to the system and intentionally 
misused that access in a manner that negatively 
affected the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of 
the organization’s information system. 
• Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). These are 
parasitical-form-cyber-attacks that infiltrate systems to 
establish a foothold in the computing infrastructure of 
target companies from which they smuggle data and 
intellectual property. 
• Data Loss (DL). For reasons like the deletion by the 
cloud service provider or a physical catastrophe 
accidently including earthquake or a fire leading to the 
permanent loss of customer data. Providers or cloud 
consumers have to take adequate measures to back up 
data, following best practices in business continuity 
and disaster recovery - as well as daily data backup 
and possibly off-site storage. 
• Insufficient Due Diligence (IDD). An organization that 
rushes to adopt cloud technologies and chooses cloud 
service providers (CSPs) without performing due 
diligence exposes itself to a myriad of commercial, 
financial, technical, legal and compliance risks. 
• Abuse and Nefarious Use of Cloud Services (ANU).  
Poorly secured cloud service deployments, free cloud 
service trials, and fraudulent account sign-ups via 
payment instrument fraud expose cloud computing 
models such as IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS to malicious 
attacks. 
• Denial of Service (DOS). DOS attacks are meant to 
prevent users of a service from being able to access 
their data or their applications by forcing the targeted 
cloud service to consume inordinate amounts of finite 
system resources so that the service cannot respond to 
legitimate users.  
• Shared Technology Vulnerabilities (STV). Cloud 
service providers deliver their services by sharing 
infrastructure, platforms or applications. The 
infrastructure supporting cloud services deployment 
may not have been designed to offer strong isolation 
properties for a multitenant architecture (IaaS), re-
deployable platforms (PaaS) or multi-customer 
applications (SaaS). This can lead to shared technology 
vulnerabilities that can potentially be exploited in all 
delivery models. 
A security threat usually exploits one or more 
vulnerabilities in components of a system to compromise it. 
The relationship between security vulnerabilities and these 
recognized threats is thus essential for the threat model. 
Hashizume et al. [14] identified seven major security 
vulnerabilities in cloud computing. 
• Insecure interfaces and APIs (V1). Cloud providers 
offer services that can be accessed through APIs 
(SOAP, REST, or HTTP with XML/JSON). The 
security of the cloud depends upon the security of 
these interfaces. Vulnerabilities are weak credential, 
insufficient authorization checks, and insufficient 
input-data validation. Furthermore, cloud APIs are still 
immature which means that they are frequently 
changed and updated. A fixed bug can introduce 
another security hole in the application. 
• Unlimited allocation of resources (V2). Inaccurate 
modeling of resource usage can lead to overbooking or 
over-provisioning. 
• Data-related vulnerabilities (V3). This is one of the 
biggest cloud challenges involving data issues. Data 
can be co-located with the data of unknown owners 
(competitors, or intruders) with a weak separation. 
Data may be located in different jurisdictions which 
have different laws. Incomplete data deletion – data 
cannot be completely removed. Data backup is done 
by untrusted third-party providers. Information about 
the location of the data usually is unavailable or not 
disclosed to users. Data is often stored, processed, and 
transferred in clear plain text. 
• Vulnerabilities in Virtual Machines (V4). Beside data-
related, vulnerability in Virtual Machines is a big 
challenge in cloud security. It includes several aspects. 
Possible covert channels in the colocation of VMs. 
Unrestricted allocation and de-allocation of resources 
with VMs. Uncontrolled Migration - VMs can be 
migrated from one server to another server due to fault 
tolerance, load balance, or hardware maintenance. 
Uncontrolled snapshots – VMs can be copied in order 
to provide flexibility, which may lead to data leakage. 
Uncontrolled rollback could lead to reset 
vulnerabilities - VMs can be backed up to a previous 
state for restoration, but patches applied after the 
previous state disappears. VMs have IP addresses that 
are visible to anyone within the cloud - attackers can 
map where the target VM is located within the cloud. 
• Vulnerabilities in Virtual Machine Images (V5).  
Uncontrolled placement of VM images in public 
repositories. VM images are not able to be patched 
since they are dormant artefacts. 
• Vulnerabilities in Hypervisors (V6).  These 
vulnerabilities stem from is the complexity of the 
hypervisor code. 
• Vulnerabilities in Virtual Networks (V7). The 
vulnerabilities are associated with the sharing of 
virtual bridges by several virtual machines. 
We identify and tabulate the connection between 
security threats and vulnerabilities in Table 1. It is seen that 
a security threat may have several security vulnerabilities 
and one vulnerability may be exploited by several security 
threats. For example, in terms of threat Data Breaches (DB), 
five vulnerabilities are involved in this security threat: 
Insecure interfaces and APIs (V1), Data-related 
vulnerabilities (V3), Vulnerability in Virtual Machines (V4), 
Vulnerabilities in Virtual Machine Image (V5), and 
Vulnerabilities in Virtual Networks (V7). Ristenpart et al. 
[15] indicated the confidential information can be extracted 
from VMs co-located in the same server. An attacker may 
use several attacks to collect data by exploiting 
vulnerabilities in brute-forcing, measuring cache usage, and 
load-based co-residence detection data processing 
techniques in cloud systems. Therefore, data leak depends 
TABLE 1: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECURITY THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES 
 Threat Description Vulnerabilities Incidents 
1 DB Data Breaches V1, V3, V4, V5, V7 
An attacker can use several attack techniques involved like SQL, command injection, and cross-site 
scripting. Virtualization vulnerabilities can be exploited to extract data. 
2 IAM 
Weak Identity, Credential 
and Access Management 
V1, V3 An attacker can leverage the failure to use multifactor authentication, or weak password uses. 
3 API Insecure interfaces APIs V1 
An attacker can take advantage of weakness in using APIs like SOAP, HTTP protocol. Bugs in 
APIs can be also exploited.  
4 SV System Vulnerabilities  V4, V5, V6, V7 
An attacker can attack via vulnerabilities in Virtual Machine images, in Hypervisors, and in Virtual 
Networks. 
5 AH Account Hijacking V1 To get access system, attackers can use the victim’s account  




V1, V4, V5, V6, V7 
An attacker can use several kinds of vulnerabilities from specific virtual cloud or APIs to infect 
bugs permanently in the target system for mainly scavenging data. 
8 DL Data Loss V3, V4, V7 
An attacker can use data-driven attack techniques to gain confidential information from other VMs 
co-located in the same server. Or using the risk of data backup, storing process to scavenge data.  
9 IDD Insufficient Due Diligence V4, V6 
An attacker can leverage weaknesses in complying rules in using cloud system like configuration of 
VMs, data and technology shares. 
10 ANU 
Abuse and Nefarious Use 
of Cloud Services 
V4 
An attacker can attack through use and share of servers, data of customers by using anonymous 
account. 





An attacker can sniff and spoof virtual networks or use the flexible configuration of Virtual 
Machines or hypervisors to exploit. 
 
not only on data-related vulnerabilities but also from 
virtualization vulnerabilities.  
Table 1 indicates that the Data-related vulnerability (V3) 
involves in three security threats. First, it may cause the 
threat Data Breaches (DB) when an attacker uses several 
techniques like SQL injection, cross-site scripting to attack 
the cloud system. Second, it may lead to the threat Weak 
Identity, Credential and Access Management (IAM) where 
an attacker may leverage the data that is often stored, 
processed, and transferred in clear plain text to gain access to 
the cloud system. Third, it may cause the threat Data Loss 
(DL) when an attacker exploits several involved 
vulnerabilities like different located data, incomplete data 
deletion, and data backup. 
IV. MARKOV MODEL FOR SUCCESSFUL ATTACKS 
We introduce a Markov process to describe a cloud 
attack model and use the CVSS to determine the transition 
matrix of the proposed Markov. 
A security threat is a stochastic process. We model it as a 
Markov chain. The probability of transition from one state to 
others is based on the vulnerabilities present in the current 
state.  An attacker exploits various vulnerabilities to arrive at 
a security threat state and eventually reaches the final failure 
state. At this stage, we mainly focus on a first level of 
abstraction with visible and quantifiable states and construct 
3 states, namely the secure state (S), the threat state (T), and 
the failure state (F). Figure 1 depicts the proposed Markov 
model for modeling security threats and attacks with state 
transition probabilities where α denotes the transient 
probability from state S to state T, β denotes the transient 
possibility from T back to S, γ denotes the probability to 
change the state from T to F, δ denotes the transient 
probability from F state back to T state, ɛ denotes the 
possibility from F state back to S state. The model takes all 
elements of an attack model into account including attack, 
defense and recovery factors of the system. We do not 
present the direct transition probability from state S to state F 
for several reasons. First, we are investigating the impact of 
security threat on failure system and how an attacker takes 
advantages from security threats. An attacker tries to exploit 
vulnerabilities to change from secure state to threat state. 
Second, the system collapsed (goes directly from S to F) 
mainly in case of natural disasters or similar catastrophes. 
This model is simple and practical for our consideration. 
Even with this 3-state model, it is difficult to derive a set of 
data for its complete description. We refine the model in 
several steps for our investigation. 
Figure 2 shows the attack model with the defense 
elements absorbed into the failure state. It means there is no 
the transient probability from F to T or from F to S. when the 
process reaches F, it stays there with probability 1. This 
means, recovery process is not taken into account. 
 
Fig. 1. Diagram of attack model with defense and recovery 
 
Fig. 2. Diagram of attack model with defense and without recovery 
 
Fig. 3. Diagram of attack model without defense and recovery 
Figure 3 shows the attack model with the defense efforts 
absorbed both at the threat state and the failure state. We 
focus on this kind of abstraction of this model. The aim is to 
compute the successful chance of attacks by an attacker 
deploying vulnerabilities of a threat. We do not take into 
account the recovery element of the system at this stage of 
investigation as it can be incorporated at a later stage. 
Furthermore, recovery efforts largely depend on the manager 
of the system and relevant data is not often disclosed. The 
probability from S to T also means the overall probability 
that includes the defense element that system tries to change 
state from T back to S. 
We are interested in finding the transition probability 
from state S to state F in the attack sequence. Chapman–
Kolmogorov equation [16] is available to find the transient 
probability between two states after a number of jump-steps. 
Once the distribution of probability on the states of a Markov 
chain is discrete and this space is homogeneous, it can be 
showed by matrix multiplication. Therefore, to derive the 
transition probability between two states in a number of 
steps, Chapman–Kolmogorov equation can be used as 
follows: 
  m n m n
ij ik kjP P P
+ =  (1) 
Where, P is the probability matrix of transition of state 
space. m n
ijP
+  is the transition probability from state i to state j 
after (𝑚 + 𝑛) steps via any state k. 
V. DISTRIBUTION OF SECURITY THREAT PROBABILITIES 
To compute the distribution of security threat 
probabilities based on Markov chain, 3 phases can be 
presented as follows: modeling security threat model as the 
Markov chain; building transition probability matrix; 
computing the transition probability from state S to state F 
via each threat T. 
Phase 1: modeling security threat model as the Markov 
chain. Figure 4 shows attack model that expands the general 
model in the figure 3 with twelve attack paths. This is 
modeled as a Markov chain with fourteen states including a 
security state, a failure state, and twelve threat states. The 
security is defined as a state of system that has no failure or 
security threats. The failure is a state when the system fails to 
meet its minimum requirements because of security issues 
that an attacker could exploit security vulnerability of 
specific threat. Each security threat is expressed by possible 
attack path that an attacker can utilize a set of vulnerabilities 
of a specific threat. These paths are possible ways to reach 
failure system target. In this model, we assume that the 
probability of attack path is overall probability that includes 
defense element. This is a simplification as it is possible that 
the system can move from one threat state to other 
determined threat states to reach the failure state.  
 
Fig. 4 Security threat model with attack process 
Phase 2: building transition probability matrix. The 
probability of each attack path is considered as the probability 
of changing state security to failure caused by each security 
threat. This means when an attacker attacks the cloud system 
successfully there will be a transition probability from a 
security to failure state as called potential successful attack or 
probability of security threats. In other words, an attacker 
leverages security vulnerabilities of each security threat (the 
attack path) to attack to reach the failure state of the cloud 
system. From the attack model (see the figure 4) we arrive at 
a transition probability Pij  matrix with fourteen states 








































In which, α is the sum of probability of all attack paths 
from S state to T states. And 𝛾𝐹 is the sum of the probability 
of all threat states to failure state. Once the system is in the 
security state, it will remain in his state with probability (1-α) 
and once the system is in the failure state, the probability is 1 
(the absorbing state). The probabilities of attack paths 
representing from S to T states are 𝛼1, 𝛼2, 𝛼3 etcetera. The 
probabilities of attack paths representing from threats states 
to the failure state are 𝛾1𝐹, 𝛾2𝐹 , 𝛾3𝐹  etcetera. And there are 
the probabilities from one state to other states. However, for 
the purpose of demonstrate the model, it is assumed that 
there is one path from one threat state to another threat state. 
These probabilities are presented as 𝛾1, 𝛾2, 𝛾3 etcetera. 
Phase 3: computing the transition probability from state S 
to state F via threats 𝑇𝑖 . According attack paths theory, each 
attack path represents the path that the attacker will take 
advantage to reach the failure state (F) from a threat state (T) 
by exploiting the set of vulnerabilities (vij) of each security 
threat. For example, we assume that attack path 1 represents 
the path that the attacker exploits vulnerability of threat 1 
(Data Breaches-DB). Thus, there is a distribution of 
probability of attack paths when attackers may choose one 
path to attack in the space of attack paths. To quantify this 
distribution, we use the concept weight of each path. CVSS 
[17] can be used to weigh each path from S to T, from T to F, 
or between threats to calculate transition probabilities. The 
weight associated with the transition from S to Ti  is 
determined by computing the ratio between vulnerability 
scores from S to Ti and all vulnerability scores from S to all 
threats. By using (2), the transition probabilities (αi) from S 
to Ti can be calculated. Similarly, the transition probabilities 
(γiF) from Ti to F can be computed using (3). To compute the 
transient probability S to F via 𝑇𝑖 , (P(SF)i), (1) can be used 
to compute in a number of jump-steps. However, at this 
stage, with purpose of demonstrate the threat model based on 
Markov chain, we simulate to compute P(SF)i in two jump-
steps using (4). Therefore, the probability between threats 
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In which, i  is index of an attack path, vij  is the 
vulnerability score of vulnerability j associated path i, kϵP is 
the set of attack paths. 
TABLE 2. VULNERABILITY SCORES 
Vulnerability Acronym Exploitability score 
CVE-2017-14925 V1 8 
CVE-2014-4064 V2 2 
CVE-2015-5255 V3 3 
CVE-2015-4165 V4 5 
CVE-2016-0264 V5 7 
CVE-2015-1914 V6 5 
CVE-2017-6710 V7 7 
To calculate probability distribution of security threats, 
we need to determine elements of the Markov transition 
matrix based on the vulnerabilities associated with a threat. 
From the security state S, the total probability that the system 
moves to one of the threat states is assumed α (α = 0.0318 
[18]). We can determine the transition probability that the 
system moves from S to Ti as the ratio of the sum of 
vulnerability scores of threats associated with Ti  over the 
total CVSS scores of all threats.  
Table 2 shows the CVSS scores [17] associated with 
relevant vulnerabilities considered in this paper. According 
to CVSS this number is out of ten score. For example, V1 
scores eight out of ten because the severity of this 
vulnerability is very high once it is related to cloud data 
breaches vulnerabilities. In addition, to go to state 𝑇1 from S, 
an attacker needs to exploit the certain set of vulnerabilities 
associated with the security threat state 𝑇1 . In this case, 
vulnerabilities one, three, four, five, and seven will be 
exploited (see Table 1). Therefore, the number of 
vulnerability scores for the attack path one is 
(W1=V1+V3+V4+V5+V7=30) and the total number of all 
vulnerability score from S to any Ti  (W=177). We can 
estimate the transition probability from S to T1 ( α1 =
30 177⁄ ∗ α = 0.00539 ). Similarly, other transition 
probability from S to Ti will be computed by using (9). We 
assume that the transition probability from state Ti to F is 
highly likely with probability  γiF = 0.95  for any attack 
paths (see Figure 4). By computing αi and γiF, the transition 
probability matrix P is obtained. Then by using (1) and (4), 
we have the probabilistic distribution of twelve security 
threats expressed in Table 3.  
TABLE 3 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION OF TWELVE SECURITY THREATS  
 Threats Formula Probability (*10-3) 
1 DB α1 ∗ 𝛾1𝐹 5.120339 
2 IAM α2 ∗ 𝛾2𝐹 1.877458 
3 API α3 ∗ 𝛾3𝐹 1.365424 
4 SV α4 ∗ 𝛾4𝐹 4.096271 
5 AH α5 ∗ 𝛾5𝐹 1.365424 
6 MI α6 ∗ 𝛾6𝐹 2.389492 
7 APT α7 ∗ 𝛾7𝐹 5.461695 
8 DL α8 ∗ 𝛾8𝐹 2.560169 
9 IDD α9 ∗ 𝛾9𝐹 1.706780 
10 ANU α10 ∗ 𝛾10𝐹 0.853390 
11 DOS α11 ∗ 𝛾11𝐹 1.706780 
12 STV α12 ∗ 𝛾12𝐹 1.706780 
The computation of a security threat probability 
distribution is essential for creating security metrics [19] 
especially in security risk metrics [20]. The above approach 
showed that it is effective for cloud computing. Apparently, 
this method can also be tailored in other cyber systems such 
as Internet of Things (IOTs) and software-defined 
systems/services [21]. This computation can support security 
managers to make security decisions. For example, as seen in 
table 3, the probabilities of security threats DB or APT is 
quite high. Hence, the security action plan can focus on 
deteriorating the impact of these kinds of threat. In case of 
reducing the damage in overall, we can apply several specific 
countermeasures or security standard compliance to decrease 
the probability of each threat. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper introduced a security threat model based on 
graph theory. For this purpose, we applied Markov chain to 
this model with three states to identify the attack paths 
through various security threats. Twelve security threats 
reported by CSA and seven security vulnerabilities scored 
by CVSS were investigated to support to demonstrate the 
security threat model to compute the probability distribution 
of security threats. Our future work is to develop novel 
quantitative security metrics, that use this computation of 
probability distribution of security threats, to measure 
security domains in a cloud system for determining the 
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